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Some historical ﬁction likes to ask ‘what if?’
Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America wonders
what would have happened if Charles
Lindberg, friendly to Hitler and a closet anti-
Semite, had been elected President of the U.S
in 1940. Richard Clarke, author of last year’s
Against All Enemies, looks ten years into the
future and asks in a recent Atlantic Monthly article
what will the U.S. look like in 2011 if the country
fails to develop adequate responses and policies
toward militant terrorists and jihadists. Azar Naﬁsi’s
Reading Lolita in Tehran shows in detail what Iran
looked like when the ayatollahs succeeded in imposing
their fundamentalist ideology on every citizen and most
particularly on women. The three readings offer in their
turn what might be termed alternative, anticipated, and
actual history.
Roth employs his narrator Philip, presumably his young
self, to recount the difﬁculties confronted by his family
before and during the Lindberg presidency. His family
members and relatives respond to the accelerating per-
secution in typical ways: resistance, denial, collabora-
tion, even acceptance. Programs that at ﬁrst seem
harmless take on sinister overtones.  Philip realizes that
“turned wrong way round, the relentless unforeseen
was what we school children studied as ‘History,’ harm-
less history, where everything unexpected in its own
time is chronicled on the page as inevitable. The terror
of the unforeseen is what the science of history hides,
turning a disaster into an epic.” For the Jewish family
and wider New Jersey community to which Philip
belongs, the Lindberg presidency, made possible because
of his epic ﬂight across the Atlantic, is a disaster. He
campaigns on a pledge to keep the U.S. disengaged from
European affairs—no American boy will die in a foreign
war—and shortly after his election signs an ‘under-
standing’ with Hitler and another shortly thereafter
with the Japanese premier. Only the American Jewish
community opposed the administration, in great mea-
sure because given its history, Jews could foresee all too
clearly where such isolationist and nativist sentiments
led. The administration creates a Just Folks program, “a
volunteer work program introducing city youth to the
traditional ways of heartland life,” which Philip’s broth-







tion’s Ofﬁce of American
Absorption and serves as the 
administration’s Jewish apologist.
The anti-Semitism intensiﬁes. Walter Winchell, who
has used his weekly radio broadcast to oppose Lindberg,
decides to campaign for the presidency in  September
1942. Intense anti-Semitism becomes virulent. Winchell
is assassinated in Boston. The Justice Department starts
rounding up and arresting prominent Jews. Hitler’s for-
eign minister von Ribbentrop travels to Washington
ostensibly to attend a state dinner but actually to pres-
sure Lindberg to formulate “more stringent anti-Jewish
measures.” Lindberg, who to enhance his mystique ﬂew
himself to his political rallies and meetings, disappears.
The facts, as they emerge, reveal that the Nazis have
held Lindberg’s young son—supposedly kidnapped—in
a German military school and kept Lindberg hostage to
him. Vice President Wheeler orders mass arrests of
prominent ﬁgures which causes a backlash that ulti-
mately returns Franklin Roosevelt to the White House
in 1942. FDR takes the nation into war and history
resumes its epic chronology.
On one level I suppose it can be said that Roth’s alterna-
tive history (which I’ve condensed rather severely) pur-
ports to show how easily such persecutions could occur
in the U.S. and the extent to which otherwise decent
people would permit them. Roth offers us a political
moral allegory. Elect a charismatic and celebrated presi-
dent with little domestic experience and less interna-
tional expertise but a strong sense of how the world
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ber being disappointed that the ﬁlm of the actual tsuna-
mi was so inferior to the Hollywood depiction of a simi-
lar, though ﬁctional, event. Did others have this
reaction, and did we Americans respond less aggressive-
ly to the event than we would have if the coverage had
matched the impact of the ﬁlm?
Ironically, a second problem that is created by a fascina-
tion with disaster is that at the same time as we dilute
its real impacts, we may come to exaggerate its likely
impact in our lives. That is, surrounded by death and
disaster in our news and entertainment, we get the
impression that it is much more common than the data
demonstrates. What is your impression of the danger
posed to you by crime?  Consider some data on the rates
of crime in America. 
According to data produced by the U.S. Federal Bureau
of Investigation, in 2002 there were some 15,500 mur-
ders in the United States. So how likely is it that you
will be the victim of a murder?  To ﬁgure it out you need
to look at the total number of murders and compare it
to the number of people who are potential murder vic-
tims. In reporting these ﬁgures in the Statistical
Abstract of the United States , the statisticians calculate
a rate of murder for the United States per hundred thou-
sand population. Using a population ﬁgure of approxi-
mately 275,000,000 for the United States and a ﬁgure of
15,500 murders we ﬁnd that in 2002 there were 5.6 mur-
ders for every hundred thousand Americans. Is that a
high number?  Let’s bring it down to one person, like
maybe you. In 2002 the odds of one person (in this case,
you) being murdered completely at random was 1 in
560,000, or a tiny fraction of a 1 percent chance.
Of course, murder is not randomly distributed in any
population. Some people run a far greater risk of being
murdered than others do, and rates change over time.
For example, the murder rate in the United States has
changed in the last two decades. In fact, it has declined
dramatically. Since 1980 the murder rate in America has
dropped nearly in half from 10.2 per hundred thousand
American residents, to 5.6 per hundred thousand in
2002. The really sharp drop in this rate began in the mid
1990’s. In 1994 the rate was still 9 murders per hundred
thousand inhabitants. 
This is data for the whole country. If you are thinking
about your safety here in Massachusetts, we’ll have to
look for more information. As it happens, the data for
2001 reveals that compared with the national rate, the
Massachusetts rate is quite low at 2 murders per hun-
dred thousand population. Only Maine, New
Hampshire, North Dakota and Vermont had lower mur-
der rates at 1 per hundred thousand residents. If you are
thinking about relocating and are concerned about this
particular threat to your safety, you might not want to
move to Mississippi or to Louisiana with murder rates
of 10 and 11 per hundred thousand respectively.  And
Washington D.C. should be completely out of the ques-
tion since its murder rate of 41 per hundred thousand
population in 2001 was nearly the highest in the coun-
try. The highest rates were in Detroit (41 and a bit),
Saint Louis (42) and New Orleans (44). In fact, cities in
general have higher murder rates than do less densely
settled areas. For example, while the 2001 murder rate
for Massachusetts was only 2 persons per hundred
thousand population, the rate for Boston was 11. If you
still want to live in a fairly large city and are looking for
low murder rates, try Austin, Texas (3.9 per hundred
thousand residents), or Honolulu (2.3).
I have been trying to demonstrate that the dangers of
the world are greatly exaggerated by the American
entertainment and news industries. For their own bene-
ﬁts they show us too much murder and mayhem. And I
admit that I have stacked the statistical deck somewhat
by focusing on just murder rates. After all, murder is not
all we can worry about. But even if you include all the
violent crimes recorded by the FBI statistics for 2002,
there were still less than 5 chances in 1,000 of being the
victim of a violent crime in America in that year. Try liv-
ing in really dangerous places like Iraq, Rwanda or the
Democratic Republic of Congo where war or the lack of
a rule of law makes daily life deadly for nearly anyone
who ventures outdoors.
I am not saying that we should ignore the rates of mur-
der and violent crime in America. We most certainly
should work hard to ﬁght such crimes, especially in
those areas and among those populations who are at
greatest risk of being victims. We are, in fact, spending
more than ever in this effort. Since 1980, federal expen-
ditures for items like agriculture, transportation and
education have roughly tripled, while spending on the
administration of justice has increased nine-fold.
Prisoners under jurisdiction of state and federal correc-
tions systems have quadrupled over the same time peri-
od, and the number of Americans who are in the
criminal justice system, either because they are in jail,
prison, on parole or on probation has gone from 1.8 mil-
lion in 1980 to more than 6.5 million in 2001. That is 3.1
percent of the entire American population. We sure are
taking the problem of crime seriously. But we may also
be overreacting. We seem to be feeding our citizens a
large diet of what George Gerbner, Professor of
Communications and Dean Emeritus of the Annenberg
School of Communication in Philadelphia calls a “Mean
World View.”  According to Gerbner, the mean world
syndrome results in a reduced sensitivity to the conse-
quences of violence along with an increased sense of
vulnerability and dependence. Ultimately, the result can
be a demand for extreme reaction from our government,
at all levels. In this distorted concept of reality the dan-
gers that exist in our lives are magniﬁed beyond reason
and may lead us to overreact to them. Perhaps such a
view allows us to accept the restrictions of legislation
like the Patriot Act or some form of national identiﬁca-
tion cards that the US Congress is currently consider-
ing. We should probably examine why violence sells,
and talk seriously to the people who sell it.
—William C. Levin is Professor of Sociology 
and Associate Editor of the Bridgewater Review.
should be organized, confront that president with a
threat, and see how quickly public hysteria will wither
individual rights. Roth’s family story, the one narrated
by Philip, shows a family trying to hold together amid
unforeseen and unpredictable events. In a world where
being different simultaneously means being frightening
to others who don’t understand you and frightened all
the time yourself of their ignorance, one’s only defense
may lie in an active and skeptical intelligence. Even that
may not be enough to prevent disaster.
Disaster is what Richard Clarke anticipates for the U.S.
if the government fails to learn from the mistakes that
led up to and followed September 11, 2001. “Ten Years
Later” takes the form of a September 11, 2011 anniver-
sary lecture to the Kennedy School of Government. The
lecturer, presumably Clarke himself, looks back on “the
second wave of al-Qaeda attacks” that have brought the
U. S. “spiral[ing] downward in terms of economic
strength, national security, and civil liberties.” Rather
than use commercial airliners as bombs to destroy large
buildings, this second wave of attacks begins with sui-
cide bombers who detonate themselves in casinos,
theme parks, and other places where Americans gather
for amusement. The nation’s permissive gun laws allow
terrorists to arm themselves and attack shopping malls
and public transit systems. Terrorists will inﬁltrate com-
puter networks with viruses and worms. Ultimately,
they attack chemical plants and cause panic in the areas
surrounding those plants.
Meanwhile American foreign policy, in taking an arro-
gant go it alone approach to Europe and the Middle
East, has exacerbated tensions and produced greater
instability. Using Saudi Arabia as its base for bombing
Iran and destroying that nation’s nuclear facilities, the
U.S. inﬂames anti-American feelings among Islamic
fundamentalists who ultimately overthrow the House
of Saud. Crude oil prices skyrocket to $85 a barrel.
In the U.S. anti-Arab hostility leads to acts against
American citizens of Middle Eastern descent even
though few of the second wave terrorists derive from
the Middle East. Congress imposes a new draft and cre-
ates new courts to handle suspected terrorists.
Civil liberties erode in the face of domestic security
threats, real and perceived. America becomes a funda-
mentally different country, suspicious of its neighbor
Canada, alienated from its European and Asian allies,
and enervated by internal indecision and dissent.
Clarke clearly anticipates some such scenario coming
into play if the American government doesn’t correct
mistakes it made leading up to and after 9-11. Not since
the Carter Administration has the U.S. made any seri-
ous attempt to lessen the country’s dependence on
imported foreign oil. That must change. The U.S. must
develop adequate and accurate intelligence about the
middle Eastern countries and about the various terror-
ists networks working within them. We as a nation
must be prepared to engage “the Islamic world in a 
true battle of ideas.” (I infer that Clarke doesn’t think
the recently enacted reorganization of the intelligence
agencies and creation of an intelligence ‘czar’ accom-
plished what’s needed in this area.) Finally, the U.S.
must correct the mistakes that resulted from the inva-
sion of Iraq, the greatest of which—as he predicted in
Against All Enemies—would be creation of a breeding
and training ground for new generations of terrorists.
One can pray that Clarke’s anticipations are wrong, 
but as he says in a concluding author’s note, his 
scenario is not worst case; nuclear and biological 
attacks are worst case.
Perhaps not, though. Azar Naﬁsi recounts life in Iran
during the Cultural Revolution as the ayatollahs sys-
tematically transformed Iran into the Islamic Republic
of Iran by imposing their fundamentalist religious ideol-
ogy on the country. Daily life became a matter of fearful
encounters with squads of thought police, the enforcers
of Islamic law: the Revolutionary Guards who would
arrest and carry away people who might never again be
seen; and government committees that proposed new
laws and restrictions on all forms, particularly Western
forms, of thought and expression. The Islamic Republic
practiced totalitarian brainwashing on a national scale
and, disastrously, tried to extend it to Iraq in what
resulted in a war of attrition for both countries. Reading
Lolita in Tehran follows the lives of Naﬁsi, who had been
teaching English and American literature at the
University of Tehran before she was dismissed, and
eight of her female students as they met to read and dis-
cuss novels by Nabokov, Fitzgerald, Austen, James and
others. Reading acted as resistance to the ayatollahs’
view that history was wholly foreseen and encom-
passed in the words of the prophet. For Naﬁsi and her
female students literature functioned to keep alive
imagination and skeptical intelligence and their crucial
place in deﬁning and locating the self. Literature for
them functioned, as it must in any society that hopes to
remain vital and open, as subversive of the orthodox,
the status quo, the idée ﬁxe, the horror.
And that is why in one signiﬁcant respect Richard
Clarke is right. The U.S. as a nation must engage in 
a serious contest of ideas with cultures it until now 
has made minimal efforts at understanding. Vietnam
should have taught us that. Failure to do so will bring
those alternative or anticipated visions of history
into terrifying actuality. ‘What if ’ will be followed 
by ‘what now?’
—Charles Angell is Professor of English 
and Book Review Editor of the Bridgewater Review.
